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We use measures of competitive pressure, administrative autonomy and staffing 
practices to explain the private-public performance difference in Australia, Portugal 
and Spain using the TALIS-PISA dataset. We employ OLS regression and 
counterfactual decomposition analysis on matched sub-samples. These school factors 
do not explain the overall private-public performance gap in the three countries 
except at the higher-end of the distribution. In other words, these factors appear to 
benefit only the high-performers in private schools in Australia and Spain. The 
results point to the potential limits of adopting private school practices for improving 
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The debate on the efficiency of private versus public schools has a long history. However, an 
empirical understanding of the role of `systemic’ features of educational institutions and 
outside organization factors (e.g., competition, autonomy) behind public and private schools’ 
differential performance is still limited, particularly from an international perspective. 
This paper focuses on understanding how systemic differences between private and 
public educational institutions (namely competitive pressure, administrative autonomy, 
staffing practices and accountability) can explain differences in students’ performance 
(measured by maths, reading and science test scores) in three countries with diverse 
education systems: Australia, Portugal and Spain. For this purpose, we rely on the Teaching 
and Learning International Survey-Program for International Student Assessment (TALIS-
PISA) which provides a unique set of student and school variables relevant for our study.  
Few considerations make TALIS-PISA link the ideal dataset to answer our main research 
question. First, although in isolation PISA is missing the teacher level data and TALIS the 
student level data (Kaplan and McCarty, 2013), TALIS-PISA provides a linkage of the two 
key elements of learning outcomes within public and private schools. On the one hand, 
TALIS includes, among others information on how the work of teachers is recognised, 
reviewed, supported and rewarded and the role of school leaders (Austin et al., 2015; Sallies 
et al., 2016) and, on the other hand, characteristics of the students and schools are included in 
PISA (OECD, 2012a). Second, TALIS offers unique, detailed (e.g., teacher demographic 
characteristics, school leadership, teacher professional development, systems of feedback and 
appraisals) as well as internationally comparable information on learning environments and 
the working conditions in schools (Freeman et al., 2014).1 Indeed, as our paper is an 
empirical cross-country study, having comparable reliable dataset on systemic differences 
between private and public educational institutions is critical. 
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A central issue in studying the private-public performance difference is the problem of 
identification arising from selection bias; students and families select public or private 
schools and are not placed in them randomly. Students from more affluent and educated 
families are more likely to be enrolled in private schools resulting in a systematically 
different social composition within private schools compared to public schools (Dronkers and 
Robert, 2008). This complicates isolating the so-called `private school effect’ (Hanushek, 
1986; Rivkin et al., 2005).  
Looking at the complete characterization of the relationship between learning scores and 
private and public enrolment, beyond the students at the mean, is important too. Numerous 
studies look at effects at different performance quantiles to explain gaps in achievement for 
contrasting groups; for instance: gender differences (Robinson and Lubienski, 2011), private-
public school differences (Oliveira et al., 2013), urban-rural differences (Lounkaew, 2013), 
and for instruction time in low achieving schools (Battistin and Meroni, 2016). A quantile 
approach to private-public learning gap is similarly relevant since it is linked to the effect of 
school systemic factors mediated by school quality (measured by students’ performance 
quantile). It is also important methodologically since unobserved family inputs and ability are 
related to where a student’s performance falls within the learning distribution. 
After accounting for identification issues underlying the public private learning gap in 
these three countries, we investigate to what extent are systemic school factors important in 
understanding the differential performance of public and private schools. In other words, 
which systemic factors influence the private-public performance gap all else equal. We also 
ask if the effect of these systemic school factors vary by whether a student is a low or a high 
performer to understand more closely the potential mechanisms through which private 
schools may (or may not) outperform public schools.  
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To conduct this analysis, we proceed in three steps. First, we generate a matched sub-
sample of comparable private and public students by using matching techniques. Second, we 
present estimates for each systemic school factor on this matched sub-sample. Finally, we use 
a counterfactual decomposition analysis on the matched sub-sample to distinguish how the 
association of systemic school factors with the private-public learning gap can be 
decomposed into the changes in the covariates and changes in the coefficients, putting 
particular emphasis on how the return to each systemic school factor changes at different 
points of the learning distribution. This goes beyond mean effects and provides information 
about the entire conditional distribution of student performance. On equity grounds, knowing 
whether there is heterogeneity in the effect of systemic factors by students’ performance 
levels is vital in identifying which factors lead to larger gaps for the more disadvantaged/low 
performing public school students. 
As an illustration of what insights can be gained through the counterfactual analysis 
assume, for instance, that school accountability is the systemic factor of interest. The 
counterfactual analysis based on matched sub-samples would tell us (after isolating 
differences in performance due to students’ personal characteristics) whether private schools’ 
students would perform worse than public schools’ students if they had attended schools with 
the same average distribution of school accountability levels as public schools’ students. 
Additionally, this analysis shows how this difference changes across the learning distribution. 
In other words, if accountability varies with performance, then the counterfactual analysis 
would help us to identify whether the initial positive effect of more accountability among low 
performers in private schools fades away for top performers because of diminishing returns to 
characteristics with scores. The counterfactual analysis helps to identify which systemic 
school factors contributes more to the learning gap and for which group of achievers. In 
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addition, it allows us to divide the total effect of systemic factors into the effect of the 
coefficient and the effect of the level of the systemic school factor.  
As far as we are aware, Oliveira et al. (2013) is the only study using counterfactual 
analysis to focus on the private-public learning gap in Brazil.  Their analysis focuses purely 
on the impact of individual and regional characteristics on the school type learning gap but 
not on the role of school systemic factors. Our study also departs from their work because it 
is a cross-country study and we also employ matched sub-samples, thereby our conclusions 
are net of individual’s student characteristics.2  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review on the 
mechanisms linking the above mentioned systemic school factors (competitive pressure, 
administrative autonomy, staffing practices and accountability) with students’ achievement, 
as well as a brief description of each country’s education system. The data used is described 
in Section 3. In Section 4 we explain the empirical approach and results are presented in 
Section 5. A summary of the main findings and implications is included in Section 6. 
2. A brief review of key systemic school factors and country background 
The literature on public and private school performance is extensive and a range of 
overlapping, school-based mechanisms are discussed to explain their potential performance 
differences.  
2.1 Importance of competitive pressures, administrative autonomy, and staffing practices 
The importance of competitive pressure in improving school performance is perhaps one of 
the oldest and strongest arguments in favour of school choice (e.g., Friedman, 1955). The 
basic notion is that the presence of competition (versus a monopoly) will force all actors—
public and private alike—to ‘become more efficient in response to competition’ (Hoxby 
2001, p. 142). The arguments for greater innovation are also closely linked to the importance 
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of introducing greater competition and thus choice in the education system. According to this 
argument, a successful education system will promote ‘…unleashing the productive potential 
already present in the schools and their personnel’, whereas over-reliance on bureaucratic 
structures, rules, and regulations may serve to undermine these innovative tendencies of the 
schools and their staff (Chubb and Moe, 1990, p. 5). Indeed, the charter school phenomenon 
in the United States is predicated on the importance of innovation in charter success (e.g., 
Lubienski, 2004). 
Accountability has been understood as a mechanism to improve the quality of education 
by making schools accountable for attaining high standard (Geijsel et al., 2010). The 
combination of more autonomy and accountability is expected to improve schooling by 
promoting effectiveness and efficiency, and by binding education professionals (teachers and 
other staff members) to educational purposes and goals (Hooge et al., 2012). Increased school 
autonomy often goes together with stronger accountability demands: schools that are granted 
more decision-making power are required to account for these decisions and their impact.  
Therefore, school governance and school autonomy −that is, how education 
responsibilities are managed and resources distributed− are concepts which permeates 
throughout the learning process impacting on teaching and learning. Many education systems 
(including those in Spain and Australia) have increased the role of schools in resource 
allocation and curriculum (Woessmann, 2007). This, of course, assumes both strong 
leadership and highly qualified teachers who can identify learning needs and at the same time 
are able to act upon these needs through evaluations and accountability systems without 
being overloaded (Hanushek et al., 2013). Those who support private schooling stress the 
importance of better accountability leading to more responsive private school.  In a cross-
country study for eight countries, Bloom et al. (2015) finds that the better performance of 
autonomous schools is not linked to larger autonomy but rather how autonomy is used and 
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influenced by better school management −be it through having strong accountability of 
principals to an external governing body and exercising strong leadership through a coherent 
long-term strategy.3  
A direct reflection of greater administrative autonomy is the ways in which school 
staffing decisions are handled. If school administrators have greater autonomy in decision-
making, then it may reflect in their ability to both hire appropriate staff and to sanction or 
even fire such staff if their performance is found inadequate. Researchers have argued that 
greater reliance on school choice accompanied by greater autonomy in school functioning 
will lead to changes in the types of teachers that are hired and retained in such schools. And, 
overall, such a change will result in the hiring and retention of stronger teachers (e.g., Hoxby, 
2002; Podgursky, 2006). 
Another argument comes from the educational administration literature. The authors of 
this literature argue about the central role of school leaders in setting direction and 
developing people and organization for improving student performance. And that this in turn 
is associated with successful performance of their schools (e.g., Leithwood and Riehl, 2003). 
Presumably, school leaders with greater autonomy may be better able to not just sanction, but 
also support their staff and their organization. 
Competition, autonomy, and the resultant ability to manage school staffing each suggest 
mechanisms through which public and private school performance may partly be shaped. If 
the differences along these criteria are vast between these schools, then they may also explain 
the variation in their performance. While scholars have extensively studied the importance of 
each of these factors in understanding school performance in general, to our knowledge, these 
factors have not been used systematically and cross-nationally to explain the private-public 
performance gap as we propose to do in this paper. 
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A key challenge facing such research is the difficulty of obtaining comparable data on 
public and private school competition, autonomy, and staffing along with student 
performance. This is a challenge we are able to overcome with the TALIS-PISA link data. In 
particular, TALIS contains rich information on the working conditions of teachers and the 
learning environments in schools. Before we introduce our data and empirical approach to 
address this question, we briefly discuss some relevant details about our three study 
countries. 
2.2 Country background 
The three countries studied here (Australia, Spain, and Portugal) exhibit important 
similarities and differences in their education systems. Australia performs higher than 
average on PISA compared to the other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries and also enjoys greater than (OECD) average secondary and 
tertiary attainment. 
Both Spain and Portugal have PISA performance as well as secondary and tertiary 
attainment that are at par or below par with the OECD average. Spain and Australia have 
above average private school participation; 18% of OECD students overall attend private 
schools while in Spain and Australia, this percentage is 40% and 34% respectively. In 
Portugal, private participation is 14%, which is relatively closer to the OECD average. In 
Australia, public contributions to education are below average, whereas in Spain and 
Portugal, the total public contributions are near the OECD average. Indeed, Australia has 
extensive school choice options; according to OECD reports from 2012 and 2013, 96% of 
students there attend a school that is facing some competitive pressure (OECD 2012b, 
2013c). 
In terms of centralisation and autonomy, the three systems also provide some variation. 
Education policy is guided nationally and delivered locally at state and territory levels by 
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both government and private providers in Australia. Overall, schools there enjoy a fair 
amount of autonomy in decision making regarding instruction. 
In Spain, national and regional ministries are important for educational decisions. The 
national level defines the overall framework, and so many of the schooling and funding 
decisions are made at the regional level with limited school autonomy (OECD 2014a). 
Education policies are centralized at the national level with some recent degree of 
decentralisation in Portugal (OECD 2014b). Interestingly, school leadership roles in Portugal 
have only been professionalised since 2008 and overall, school leaders there report some of 
the lowest levels of autonomy with regard to curriculum and assessment among OECD 
countries. 
A robust amount of literature has investigated private-public performance differences in 
each of these countries. In general, this literature finds somewhat consistent evidence for a 
positive private effect on student academic and behavioral outcomes (for example, Marks 
(2009) for Australia; Pereira (2011) for Portugal; and Mancebon and Muniz (2008) for 
Spain). However, this literature has paid limited attention to correcting for selection bias, and 
even less attention to explaining what factors may be driving these private-public gaps. In 
terms of selection bias, studies with robust socioeconomic controls do find a diminishing 
private effect (see for instance, Moran, Neri, and Rodgers (2014) for Australia; Rosado and 
Seabra (2015) for Portugal; and Crespo-Cebada, Pedraja-Chaparro, and Santin (2014) for 
Spain). 
3. Data 
This study is based on the TALIS-PISA link dataset. In the Teaching and Learning 
International Survey (TALIS) of 2013, eight countries opted to conduct the survey in schools 
that participated in PISA 2012 through the TALIS-PISA link option (OECD 2013a). In these 
countries, ‘a systematic equiprobable random sample of schools from PISA 2012’ (OECD 
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2013a, p:79) was identified for the TALIS-PISA link survey. The linked dataset combines the 
TALIS insights into the backgrounds, beliefs, and practices of teachers and school leaders 
with PISA information into backgrounds, beliefs, attitudes, and cognitive outcomes of 
students (Austin et al., 2015). On the contrary, in isolation, PISA only offers measures of 
student learning whereas TALIS only provides information about teachers’ job‐ related 
attitudes (Kaplan and McCarty, 2013).  
The TALIS-PISA link dataset follows a robust design by using the structure of the PISA 
2012 sample of schools with original strata and setting a nominal sample for the TALIS-PISA 
link of 150 schools, interviewing an additional 20 teachers per schools and including schools 
if 50% of sampled teachers respond (OECD, 2013a, 2013b).  The TALIS-PISA link dataset, 
nonetheless, contains some limitations (Ferrera and Izquierdo, 2016); that is, the two surveys 
of the joint TALIS-PISA link were not implemented at the same time (PISA in 2012 and 
TALIS in 2013). Still, since the timing of the two surveys’ implementation is very close, the 
likelihood that teachers and school principals surveyed in TALIS may not be the same 
respondents who taught students evaluated in PISA, is therefore minimised. 
We follow PISA’s definition of private school which includes those that are managed 
locally, without regard to funding sources. Under this definition, private schools may or may 
not require parents to pay enrolment fees (OECD, 2011). Other PISA’s studies distinguish 
between private independent and private government dependent schools (Dronkers, J., & 
Robert, 2008) while other studies don’t make this distinction (Vandenberghe and Robin, 
2004).  We follow the latter approach because in our final sample all school falls into the 
private government dependent category as they receive between 66% and 88% of government 
funding. 
In the current analysis, we excluded Finland, Latvia, Romania, and Singapore because the 
proportion of student attending private schools was below 2% or zero in those countries. We 
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also dropped Mexico where the TALIS-PISA linked data reflected did not lead to a similar 
private-public relationship as the complete PISA data. This left us with the three countries 
included in our analysis: Australia, Portugal, and Spain. It is important to note that, in these 
countries, the distribution of students attending private schools remains nearly the same for 
the PISA and TALIS-PISA link datasets (39%–43% for Australia, 8%–9% for Portugal, and 
38%–34% for Spain for PISA and TALIS, respectively) and the impact of school type on 
achievement is qualitatively similar in both PISA and TALIS-PISA link datasets. This 
highlights the representativeness of our sample4, with the additional weighting in the TALIS-
PISA link to account for sub-sampling within the original sample of PISA schools (OECD, 
2013). 
Tables 1 and 2 display summary statistics for the key variables used in this study. Table 1 
includes the three performance outcomes and a set of student background controls we use for 
propensity score matching. Table 2 lists the school factors that we investigate to understand 
the private-public performance difference. These include the measure of principal-reported 
competitive pressure; principal-reported autonomy in staffing, budgeting, and instruction 
decisions, and principal-reported and teacher-reported sanctions and support offered to 
teachers as measures of staffing practices. 
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
4. Empirical methods 
The main objective of the paper is to examine the role of systemic school factors on the 
private-public achievement gap. We are also interested in allowing for heterogeneity in the 
response of systemic factors by students’ learning levels. In other words, we ask whether a 
systematic factor such as competition would help explain private school performance, and if 
the presence of competition differs for high- and low-achieving students.  For this we apply a 
counterfactual analysis on a comparable sub-sample. Through matching we obtain a private 
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and public school students sub-sample with similar covariates5 and then, based on this 
comparable sub-sample, we estimate the counterfactual (that is, the achievement difference 
that would have prevailed if private schools’ students had the same returns to systemic 
characteristics that public schools’ students have) decomposing the private-public learning 
scores differential across the learning distribution.  
Our aim is find out whether students’ achievement gap would have persisted if public and 
private schools had the same level of accountability, competition and staff policies, dividing 
the total difference by the impact of coefficients and characteristics in the spirit of the Oaxaca 
decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973) based on decomposition techniques (Albrecht et al., 2009; 
Chernozhukov et al., 2013; Machado and Mata, 2005; Melly; 2006).6 As a robustness 
analysis, we also examine the role of unobservables on the private school effect using 
instrumental variables within a quantile framework (see Appendix B for details).  
4.1  OLS regression and construction of matched samples 
Our first step to disentangle the net private school effect is to control for an array of student 
covariates through OLS. For each country, we estimate the following OLS regression, 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛽𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                         (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖 denotes the test scores (maths, reading, and science literacy) for student i (𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑁), 𝑆𝑖 is a dummy for school type (equal to 1 for private and 0 for public enrolment), 
and 𝑋𝑖 is a set of students and family exogenous characteristics (from Table 1).  
Next, to address selection bias introduced by school choice based on observables, we 
employ propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) which yields more robust 
estimates for the private school effect. Matching estimators allow us to derive the 
counterfactual of the treated (the outcome that a private school student would have had if he 
had attended a public school) using information on untreated students with the same 
observable characteristics as the treated individuals (Dehejia and Wahba 1999).  
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 More precisely, we estimate the average treatment on the treated (ATT) (i.e., those 
attending private school) as 𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌(1) − 𝑌(0)|𝑋, 𝑆 = 1], where 𝑌(1) and 𝑌(0) are the 
outcome of students attending private and public schools, respectively, and 𝑋 denotes the set 
of observed covariates used to calculate the propensity score (the probability for each student 
of attending private school) which is then used to impute the missing outcome by finding 
other individuals in the data whose propensity scores are similar, but who were not exposed 
to the treatment. The estimator of the ATT relies on two key assumptions: unconfoundedness 
and overlap.7 We run the propensity score matching analysis using nearest neighbour 
matching (without replacement) and use it to derive matched subsamples.8  
4.2  OLS and counterfactual decomposition analysis based on matched subsample 
In a second step, we employ OLS and a counterfactual decomposition analysis for matched 
subsamples of comparable private and public students in observed covariates. This matched 
sub-sample contains fewer observations than the original sample (i.e., 𝑁𝑚 < 𝑁 as unmatched 
comparison units are discarded). For the average student, OLS provides an initial answer on 
the role played by systemic school factors on the private-public learning gap for the matched 
subsamples of 𝑁𝑚 students, 
𝑌𝑖′ = 𝛾0 + 𝛽𝑆𝑖′ + 𝛾1𝑊𝑖′ + 𝜀𝑖′                                         (2) 
where 𝑌𝑖′ is the outcome for matched student i' (𝑖′ = 1, … , 𝑁𝑚) and 𝑊𝑖′ denotes the school 
variables (autonomy, competition and staff policies). 
Additionally, in the counterfactual decomposition analysis, learning differences at each 
point of learning distribution are decomposed into differences due to different students’ 
performance between public and private schools with the same (systemic) 𝑊 characteristics 
and a composition effect, arising due to public and private school difference on 𝑊 
characteristics. Formally, let 𝐹 be the distribution function and 𝐹−1 the inverse function, and 
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0 and 1 denote the population of public and private students, respectively, so that 𝐹(0|0) and 
𝐹(1|1)  represent observed distribution of scores for public and private students, and let 𝐹(0|1)  
(the counterfactual) represents the distribution function of scores that would have prevailed 
for private school students had they faced public students’ learning profile 𝐹(0|0). The total 
difference on the observed learning score quantile function (𝐹−1) between public and private 




−1 =  [𝐹𝑌(1|1)
−1 − 𝐹𝑌(0|1)
−1 ] − [𝐹𝑌(0|1)
−1 − 𝐹𝑌(0|0)
−1 ]                                         (3)
where the first term in brackets is due to differences in the coefficient effect for a given level 
of systemic school factors and the second term is the composition effect due to difference in 
the level of systemic school factors. One could think of the first term as an efficiency 
component measuring how a school characteristic translates into larger achievement and the 
second term as an aggregate effect linking the level of the school characteristic to 
achievement.  
We look at the effect of coefficients and covariates independently (i.e., the two terms of 
equation 3) for the whole group of school systemic factors, while emphasis is placed on the 
effect of the level or aggregated value for each school systemic factor (the second term of 
equation 3).9 Term 2 of equation (3) would inform us what a student attending a private 
school would have achieved if he/she had attended a school with same level of say, 
competition, of a student attending a public school. 
5. Results 
5.1. Summary statistics  
Summary statistics for outcomes and explanatory variables are included in Table 1. This table  
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shows that learning outcomes are consistently higher for students attending private schools, 
with private-public gaps ranging between 33–46 points in maths, reading, and science. Table 
1 also shows that private school students are better-off compared to public students in terms 
of their observed characteristics. That is, they live in households with greater wealth as well 
as with more books and higher parental education. Students attending public schools are more 
likely to be from language minorities than private school students and more prone to school 
absence. Yet distinctions between public and private schools are not just limited to whom 
they educate but also with respect to schools’ systemic factors. 
Both public and private schools across the three countries vary in important ways in terms 
of school variables. Table 2 shows that the degree of reported competition and autonomy as 
well as staffing practices also differ by school type and could be additional pathways leading 
to the private-public learning differences. Private schools report facing more competition 
alongside greater levels of autonomy in decisions regarding staffing, budgeting, and 
instructional policies. For instance, school autonomy indices for instructional policies are 
between 0.25–0.75 larger in private institutions for the three countries. 
Specifically, Australia shows overall high levels of competition and autonomy, and 
private-public differences are widest in Spain. In terms of principal-reported support and 
sanctions, private schools in Spain are especially different from their public counterparts. 
These distinctions are somewhat less pronounced in Portugal, followed by Australia. 
Teacher-reported support is generally high in Portugal, regardless of school type. Private 
schools often do better in terms of supporting their teachers. In terms of teacher-reported 
sanction, especially dismissal of under-performing teachers, private schools appear as more 
likely to exercise this form of sanction. Table 2, thus, concurs with some of the standard 
literature on the mechanisms and processes where public and private schools differ. 
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5.2. OLS estimates for the private school effect 
Having outlined the distinctions by school type in terms of who they enroll and their internal 
mechanisms, in Table 3 we present OLS estimates on public and private performance 
differences. Controlling for background attributes, the left panel of this table presents the 
results for the full sample. Controlling for student and home background, the private school 
coefficient is still statistically significant for maths, reading, and science for the three 
countries. Effects are particularly pronounced in Australia and Portugal (around 18-30 and 
24-32, respectively), even though students attending private schools in Spain achieve 
between 14-17 points above public-school students. 
[Table 3 here] 
We next present the results of the matched sample in the right panel of Table 3. Full 
details on the matching procedure can be found in Appendix A.10 As expected, matching 
amounted to a reduction in sample size in each country. In Australia and Portugal, the 
coefficient on private is no longer statistically significant for maths, with the private school 
effect being of similar magnitude as for the full sample. Overall, the private school effect 
post-matching for each country remains statistically significant, regardless of the outcome 
measured. 
5.3. OLS estimates of systemic school factors  
Before presenting the key empirical analysis on the relationship of systemic school factors 
with learning gap across the learning distribution in the next section based on matched sub-
samples, this section includes OLS impacts of systemic school factors. These estimates show 
the role of systemic school factor for the average performer. For completeness, we carry the 
analysis not only for the matched sub-samples, but also for the full sample (using the same 
students’ and families’ controls as in the previous section).  
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To begin with, Table 4 contains results for the full sample. Overall, across the five groups 
of systemic factors and the three countries, the private-public learning difference persists. The 
private school dummy only lacks statistical significance (at 10%) for maths in Australia (for 
competition, autonomy and school principal factors). In Spain, for the three outcomes for 
school principal factors while in Portugal the learning persists for all school systemic factors. 
 [Table 4 here] 
In Table 5 we present the first analysis that motivates the paper, that is, whether systemic 
differences between public and private schools explain private-public learning gaps after 
isolating individual and household factors with a matching approach. Here, using the matched 
sub-samples derived by the matching approach, results for the private school dummy are 
presented controlling for each school systemic factor.  
Estimates in Table 5 suggest that the greater competitive pressure faced by private 
schools may be important in explaining private-public performance gaps in science in 
Australia and Portugal, but not for reading. Greater school autonomy reported by private 
schools in Australia and Spain similarly appears to be important in explaining the private-
public performance gaps in these systems. But this is not true for Portugal where gaps in 
private-public autonomy are somewhat smaller (as shown in Table 2). Principal-reported 
support and sanctions both appear more important in Spain, where there are considerably 
different levels of support, promotion, and dismissal policies in private schools (see Table 2). 
Teacher-reported sanction and support are less consistently related with explaining the 
private-public performance gap, except in Portugal, where the generally higher levels of 
support received by private school teachers seem to explain the learning performance gap. 
[Table 5 here] 
A comparison of the estimates of Tables 4 and 5 shows the empirical importance that 
isolating students’ and households’ factors with a matching approach has in our application. 
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In fact, qualitative different conclusions on the role of some systemic school factors are 
obtained with either analysis. For instance, estimates for positive private-public learning gap 
for competition (science-Australia, and maths- and science- Portugal) and teacher support 
(Portugal) are significant in the full sample (with controls) but they are not in the matched 
sub-sample analysis. 
5.4. Counterfactual decomposition estimates of systemic school factors for matched sub-
samples 
This section contains the second analysis that motivates the paper. Here, by using a 
counterfactual decomposition of the learning gap based on matched sub-samples, we attempt 
to answer the following questions for comparable private and public students: Would private 
school students perform worse if they had the same distributions of systemic factors that 
public school’s students? Does the importance of school systemic factors vary by students’ 
performance level, and if so, what is behind this variation –either the effect of the systemic 
school factor per se or the aggregated level or contextual effect differences between private 
and public schools? To answer these questions, we run two sets of analyses. In the first 
analysis, we look at the total effect of school systemic factors as a whole, dividing the total 
impact between differences in coefficients (or the return to student’s characteristics) and 
differences in the aggregate level of the school systemic factors (or inputs). In the second 
analysis, we look at the relationship at the level of each specific systemic school factor with 
the private-public learning gap. 
Results for the first analysis −showing the decomposition of the private-public learning 
gap into changes in covariates and into changes in coefficients grouping all school systemic 
factors− are displayed in Figure 1 Panel A (maths) and Panel B (reading).  The y-axis 
measures the performance that private students would have had if they had attended schools 
with the same distribution of systemic characteristics (and their associations with 
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performance) than public school students, while the x-axis denotes the quantiles of the 
learning distribution. But due to the construction of the decomposition (see equation (3)), the 
interpretation of the counterfactual is in the opposite direction (sign). Hence, for a given 
quantile, a positive estimate implies that private school students would have reached a lower 
learning score under the learning profile of public school students, while a negative estimate 
implies that their achievement would have been higher (for characteristics). 
For both maths and reading, we find that most of the total positive private learning gap 
we found in Section 5.2 can be explained by the effect attributed to the covariates (for 
Australia and Spain) and for the coefficients (Portugal). This implies that in Australia and 
Spain private students perform better mainly because of the systemic factors they encounter 
in private schools where as in Portugal their better performance may be largely due to their 
own characteristics. In addition, covariates’ effects are increasing with performance for 
Australia and rather constant for Spain, while coefficient effects are decreasing with 
performance (for the three countries, though particularly for Australia and Portugal). These 
patterns are more pronounced for maths than for reading. 
[Figure 1] 
Based on 90% confidence intervals, covariates’ effects are positive and significant for all 
students regardless of their performance (in Spain) and for the 50% top half of students based 
on their performance distribution (in Australia). This suggests that all students and those 
students with above average performance attending private schools in Spain and Australia, 
respectively, would have performed worse if they had attended schools with the same level of 
systemic school factors than public schools. Put differently, the joint effect of the level of 
competition, autonomy and staffing policy acts as a distinct feature within private schools 
leading to increasing performance for those with larger ability in Australia and for all 
students in Spain, but not in Portugal. At the other end of scores’ distributions, estimates 
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suggest that low performing students attending private schools would have been worse off if 
they had the same returns to characteristics (same coefficient) of the worst-performing 
students from public schools, especially in Australia and Portugal. 
Because we find that the private learning gap is mainly linked to the aggregate value or 
contextual level of the whole set of systemic factors, it is then important to know which of the 
competition, autonomy and staffing factors is contributing more to this gap. This second part 
of the counterfactual analysis, focusing on the gap explained for the covariate of each school 
systemic factor, is included in Figure 2 (maths) and Figure 3 (reading), showing similar 
patterns for the two outcomes. 
We find that, remarkably, competition has a minor (and constant) effect (below 10 points) 
only for two countries in (i.e., Portugal and Spain – Panel A), whereas autonomy leads to 
consistently large effects for Spain for the whole distribution and for the group of high 
performing students in Australia, and its impact is negative for Portugal (Panel B). The 
degree of support that either school principals or teachers receive (Panels C and F) does not 
seem to make a difference on the private-public learning gap, hovering around zero. Yet, for 
Spain, the covariate school principal support is associated with considerable larger 
achievement (around 20 points) for private school students, decreasing as we move towards 
upper quantiles. Accountability is associated to the positive gap for private school students in 
Australia (teacher sanctions – Panel E) and Spain (school principal sanction – Panel D); in 
either case being relatively more beneficial for better performing private school students.   
6. Conclusions and discussions  
Scholars have argued that private schools perform better (or will perform better) than public 
schools due to greater competitive pressures, greater autonomy and different staffing 
practices. In this paper we investigated these hypotheses. We used the unique TALIS-PISA 
link data for Australia, Portugal and Spain which allowed us to estimate private-public 
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performance gap and to inspect whether differences in systemic school factors, namely, 
competitive pressures, autonomy, and staffing practices may help explain this performance 
gap. Given the widely acknowledged and observed gaps in the private and public students’ 
home backgrounds we used matching approaches to identify a sub-sample of public and 
private students in each country who exhibited the same observable student and family 
characteristics. We also conducted counterfactual decomposition analysis in addition to OLS 
analysis to investigate if the effect of systemic school factors varies by whether a student is a 
low or a high performer to understand more closely the potential mechanisms through which 
private schools may (or may not) outperform public schools.  
When looking at the effect that the level of specific systemic school factors has on the 
private-public learning gap we found that, across the three countries, the mechanisms that are 
traditionally forwarded to explain private school performance are not consistently significant 
in explaining their performance in the matched sub-samples –which is the most comparable 
sample of private’s and public’s school students. For instance, we found that competition has 
a small effect and additional support provided to teachers is not linked to differential 
performance by private’s and public’s school students. This, of course, may be indicative of 
inadequate measures of these institutional factors. But these findings equally support the idea 
that the mediating effect that certain school systemic factors have are more related to family 
inputs, with their effects disappearing after a robust analysis is carried out through matched 
sub-samples.  
Importantly, these findings point to the difficulty of identifying mechanisms that schools 
may ultimately adopt to change their performance. In this regard these findings are aligned 
with an extensive body of literature on school effects which highlights the difficulty of 
identifying school factors that are important in explaining variation in student performance 
(see Chudgar and Luschei, 2009, for a review). Our findings which focus more on school 
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systemic factors or processes rather than traditional inputs provide additional nuances to this 
literature (see also Norton Grubb, 2008 for a discussion of types of school resources).     
However, to the extent that school systemic factors are important, we find that a 
differentiation at which level accountability is measured is important to gain further insights 
into what drives the private-public learning gap. We found that teacher sanction is a 
consistent factor in explaining the private-public learning gap in Australia only, principal’s 
sanction is relevant only in Spain, while in Portugal accountability measured in either form is 
negatively correlated to the learning gap. In country-cases such as Australia, where the 
counterfactual decomposition pointed to larger gradients by students’ performance, 
accountability at the classroom-teacher level matters more, benefitting high performing 
students. In cases where learning is more homogenous, as we found in Spain, accountability 
at the school level (i.e., school principals) is more important in explaining the learning gap. 
The implications of these findings deserve closer attention.  
The varying importance of school systemic factors to high- and low-performing student is 
one of the key contributions of our work. Although some systemic factors might be 
individually as powerful determinants of the private-public learning gap, their joint effect 
appears to lead to substantial gains for the population of high ability students. This result 
underscore the importance of paying attention to the learning levels of students attending 
private and public schools to isolate the importance of school systemic factors Their impact, 
when present, appears to depend on how ability-segregated an education system is.  
Hence, our analysis points to a vital yet unexplored dimension in the school choice 
literature in the cross-national context: private school effects are heterogeneous across the 
learning distribution with the varying importance of school systemic factors for low, medium 
and high achieving students. We found that, competition, accountability and staffing policies 
play a limited role in narrowing the private-public gap among low performers but the reverse 
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is true for high performers. The paper’s results highlight an overreaching message: private 
school systems and processes studied here (competition, accountability and staffing policies) 
may be important to explain variation in private-public performance but perhaps only for the 
high performing students. The same “private school practices” when adopted for low 
performing students do not appear to yield greater learning levels. These findings have vital 
equity implications especially as policymakers consider growth in the private school sector 
and/or adopting similar practices of competition, accountability in the public-school sector.  
Standard caveats apply to our conclusions. First, our sample consists of three countries 
and hence we cannot claim that all conclusions will hold for a different group of countries. 
Indeed, we highlight the country-dependency nature of our results and the need for carrying 
out further research not only with a different group of countries, but also with a different set 
of institutional factors. Second, even though our estimates are based on robust techniques, we 
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Figure 1. Impact of covariates and coefficients of systemic school factors on the private-public learning gap based on matched sub-sample.  
Panel A – Maths scores  
Australia  Portugal  Spain  
   
Panel B – Reading scores  
Australia  Portugal  Spain  
   
 
Notes: (1) Counterfactual decomposition of total private school effect by the effect of covariates and coefficients using logistic distribution regression where the counterfactual population is 
defined by the private school dummy. (2) Weighted bootstrap (R=200) is used for the construction of 90% uniform confidence intervals. (3) Estimates are based on the R package counterfactual 
(Chen et al., 2016). (4) The y-axis denotes the learning profile of private students under the hypothetical case of having the same distribution of systemic characteristics of public school 
students. The x-axis denotes quantiles of the learning score distribution. (5) Interpretation. The total difference of the private-public learning gap is decomposed as the sum of changes into 
covariates (systemic factors) and changes into coefficients. First sub-plot: negative (positive) values for the covariates implies that private school’s students would perform better (worse) if they 
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had the same distribution the public schools’ students do have for the covariates. Second sub-plot:  the same interpretation but with respect to the relationship (coefficient) of systemic factor 
with the private-public learning gap. (6) Illustrative example – Australia (Panel A – Maths scores). In the first sub-plot for covariates we can see that there is a significant effect (where the 
confidence interval does not overlap with zero) in the top 40% of the distribution (for 𝜏 ≥ 0.60). This implies that only higher performers from private schools would have been worse-off if they 
had the same distribution of systemic factors than public school students.  In the second plot, for coefficients, we can see that lower performers (in the bottom 60% of the distribution) from 






Figure 2. Impact of specific covariates of systemic school factors on the private-public learning gap – Maths 
scores 
Panel A – School competition  
Australia  Portugal  Spain  
   
Panel B – School autonomy  
Australia  Portugal  Spain  
   
Panel C – School principal support  
Australia  Portugal  Spain  
   
Panel D – School principal sanction 
Australia  Portugal  Spain  












Panel E – Teacher sanction 
Australia  Portugal  Spain  
   
Panel F – Teacher support 
Australia  Portugal  Spain  
   
 





Figure 3. Impact of specific covariates of systemic school factors on the private-public learning gap – 
Reading scores.  
Panel A – School competition  
Australia  Portugal  Spain  
   
Panel B – School autonomy  
Australia  Portugal  Spain  
   
Panel C – School principal support  
Australia  Portugal  Spain  
   
Panel D – School principal sanction 
Australia  Portugal  Spain  









Panel E – Teacher sanction 
Australia  Portugal  Spain  
   
Panel F – Teacher support 
Australia  Portugal  Spain  
   
 









Table 1. Summary statistics for tests scores and explanatory variables     
   Australia   Portugal   Spain 





Test scores outcomes 















         Covariates: students 

































































Number of schools 68 54   128 12   202 108 
 
Notes: (1) Student weighted means based on PISA 2012. (2) Non-cognitive outcomes are scaled continuous indices derived 
in the dataset (see OECD [2012a] for details for items for each index). (3) Wealth is a continuous index based on students’ 
responses on whether they had various assets at home: own room, internet, televisions, computers, cars, etc. (4) Parental 
education is a discrete variable based on highest schooling: 1 (ISCED 1 or less), 2 (ISCED 2), 3 (ISCED 3B, 3C) and 4 
(ISCED 3A).  (5) Truancy measures the frequency of being late for school: 1 (none), 2 (one or two times), 3 (three or four 







Table 2. Summary statistics of school and teacher factors for matched sub-sample analysis 
  Australia   Portugal   Spain 










         School autonomy 















         School principal - support 




















         Teacher - support 





Feedback is provided on a thorough assessment of 





Measures to remedy weaknesses in teaching are 










         School principal - sanction 




















         Teacher - sanction 




















Number of schools 68 54   128 12   202 108 
 
Notes: (1) School competition is a discrete variable measuring the degree of competition 0 (none), 1 (one school), 2 (2 or 
more). (2) School autonomy comprises three indices measuring autonomy in staffing, budgeting, and instructional policies. 










Outcome Australia Portugal Spain 
 
Australia Portugal Spain 
        Maths 18.07** 23.86*** 17.00*** 
 
14.57 20.53 18.57*** 
Reading 30.48*** 31.73*** 14.18** 
 
29.03*** 29.94** 15.16** 
Science 28.15*** 26.07*** 14.09*** 
 
26.33** 24.79* 14.62*** 
        N 1,954 3,558 7,613 
 
1,396 566 4,986 
 
Notes: (1) All estimates include the students' controls and school location of Table 1. (2) Further details on the matching 
procedure and its’ quality can be found in Appendix A. (3) School clustered standard errors.  














Maths Reading Science 
 
Maths Reading Science 
 
Maths Reading Science 
Panel A: Competition 
           Private - OLS 14.18 27.54*** 24.36** 
 
20.28*** 29.69*** 26.71*** 
 
16.02*** 12.59** 12.13** 
N 1,565 1,565 1,565 
 
3,053 3,053 3,053 
 
7,455 7,455 7,455 
            Panel B: Autonomy 
           Private - OLS 8.32 20.90** 15.39 
 
26.90*** 37.15*** 29.89*** 
 
13.39* 29.40** 16.55 
N 1,593 1,593 1,593 
 
3,309 3,309 3,309 
 
7,215 7,215 7,215 
            Panel C: School principal - support 
           Private - OLS 15.07 28.02*** 24.64*** 
 
26.43*** 31.26*** 29.68*** 
 
3.10 -3.73 0.48 
N 1,579 1,579 1,579 
 
3,377 3,377 3,377 
 
4,821 4,821 4,821 
            Panel D: School principal -sanction 
           Private - OLS 14.03 29.91*** 26.71*** 
 
28.71*** 33.42*** 29.85*** 
 
-1.12 -3.30 -2.57 
N 1,579 1,579 1,579 
 
3,381 3,381 3,381 
 
4,821 4,821 4,821 
            Panel E: Teacher-sanction 
           Private - OLS 17.73* 28.93*** 24.91*** 
 
35.09*** 44.68*** 32.84*** 
 
15.83*** 14.09** 12.35** 
N 1,759 1,759 1,759 
 
3,287 3,287 3,287 
 
7,074 7,074 7,074 
            Panel F: Teacher-support 
           Private - OLS 15.76* 29.20*** 22.92*** 
 
22.06*** 30.66*** 22.37*** 
 
17.11*** 16.12*** 13.39*** 
N 1,772 1,772 1,772 
 
3,280 3,280 3,280 
 
7,019 7,019 7,019 
Notes: (1) All estimates include the students' controls and school location of Table 1 plus the specific school systemic factor. (2) School clustered standard errors.  












  Maths Reading Science 
 
Maths Reading Science 
 
Maths Reading Science 
Panel A: School competition 
           Private - OLS 8.51 25.83** 21.01 
 
12.21 22.43** 19.57 
 
18.26*** 15.10** 13.95** 
N 1,108 1,108 1,108 
 
503 503 503 
 
4,871 4,871 4,871 
            Panel B: School autonomy 
           Private - OLS -2.37 14.70 9.78 
 
32.73** 41.91*** 33.89** 
 
7.25 24.10* 8.69 
N 1,136 1,136 1,136 
 
550 550 550 
 
4,660 4,660 4,660 
            Panel C: School principal - support 
          Private - OLS 10.09 27.40** 22.21* 
 
24.15* 30.77** 33.94** 
 
-2.04 -6.30 -5.85 
N 1,114 1,114 1,114 
 
528 528 528 
 
3,327 3,327 3,327 
            Panel D: School principal -sanction 
          Private - OLS 9.24 28.70** 23.86* 
 
22.15 28.19* 29.14 
 
-4.06 -8.00 -6.68 
N 1,114 1,114 1,114 
 
526 526 526 
 
3,327 3,327 3,327 
            Panel E: Teacher-sanction 
           Private - OLS 17.04 30.07*** 25.19** 
 
18.01 30.87** 17.39 
 
16.72*** 14.57** 11.90** 
N 1,265 1,265 1,265 
 
461 461 461 
 
4,655 4,655 4,655 
            Panel F: Teacher-support 
           Private - OLS 14.72 28.54*** 22.13* 
 
7.66 16.84 7.14 
 
17.86*** 17.07*** 13.23** 
N 1,271 1,271 1,271   493 493 493   4,628 4,628 4,628 
 
Notes: (1) Each panel is a different regression where each group of covariates are introduced separately. (2) School clustered standard errors.  
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Appendix A: Quality of matching 



















































































1 2 3 4 5
K-Nearest neighbor matching
Australia
Private full sample Public full sample


















































































1 2 3 4 5
K-Nearest neighbor matching
Portugal
Private full sample Public full sample












































































1 2 3 4 5
K-Nearest neighbor matching
Spain
Private full sample Public full sample




Table A1. Differences in means for matched sample for dependent variables, propensity score and covariates by 
public/private schools 





  Private Public t-test   Private Public t-test   Private Public t-test 
Test scores outcomes 
          Maths 517.34 496.19 4.18 
 
534.38 504.59 4.31 
 
514.83 500.10 6.47 
Reading 533.30 498.74 7.10 
 
537.87 498.14 6.02 
 
518.88 503.83 6.49 
Science 539.47 509.15 5.90 
 
535.61 502.68 5.05 
 
524.30 515.10 4.21 
Propensity score 0.49 0.48 1.07 
 
0.12 0.12 0.02 
 
0.41 0.41 1.30 
            Covariates: students 
          Age 15.85 15.84 0.37 
 
15.86 15.87 -0.61 
 
15.91 15.91 -0.15 
Male 0.51 0.53 -0.59 
 
0.54 0.55 -0.34 
 
0.52 0.53 -0.68 
Language of test 0.93 0.93 0.21 
 
0.99 0.99 0.45 
 
0.85 0.86 -0.99 
Mother work 0.77 0.77 0.00 
 
0.72 0.72 0.00 
 
0.71 0.71 0.06 
Wealth 0.64 0.59 1.26 
 
0.55 0.52 0.40 
 
0.14 0.11 1.43 
Urban 0.90 0.89 0.44 
 
0.37 0.39 -0.35 
 
0.84 0.83 0.65 
Mother education level 3.40 3.43 -0.60 
 
2.60 2.61 -0.14 
 
3.23 3.22 0.39 
Father education level 3.16 3.21 -0.98 
 
2.47 2.56 -0.87 
 
3.09 3.09 -0.19 
Number of books  3.49 3.44 0.75 
 
3.04 3.12 -0.70 
 
3.60 3.58 0.58 
Truancy 1.49 1.48 0.40 
 
1.66 1.72 -1.00 
 
1.38 1.39 -0.56 
Nuclear family 0.88 0.89 -0.50 
 
0.92 0.93 -0.47 
 
0.91 0.91 -0.79 
Child immigrant 0.92 0.92 0.20 
 
0.97 0.95 0.87 
 
0.92 0.92 0.16 
N 698 698     283 283     2493 2493   
 
Notes: (1) T-test values for significance differences between private and publics variables at 10% level of significance is less 
than 1.64, and for significance level at 5% less than 1.96 (absolute values). (2) Matched samples are based on nearest 







Table A2. Matching alternative approaches estimates and performance   
    
  






Nearest neighbour Radius Kernel 
 
Nearest neighbour Radius Kernel 
 
Nearest neighbour Radius Kernel 
  No rep With rep       No rep With rep       No rep With rep     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
Test scores estimates 
              Maths 21.14*** 14.94** 21.79*** 21.11*** 
 
29.78*** 27.94*** 34.90*** 35.95*** 
 
14.74*** 17.87*** 14.49*** 15.02*** 
Reading 34.56*** 26.13*** 34.65*** 34.25*** 
 
39.73*** 39.87*** 42.94*** 42.89*** 
 
15.05*** 18.67*** 15.08*** 15.29*** 
Science 30.33*** 21.93*** 31.09*** 30.38*** 
 
32.94*** 31.36*** 36.74*** 37.27*** 
 
9.20*** 12.01*** 9.01*** 9.50*** 
               Caliper/bandwidth 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.06 
 
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.06 
 
0.016 0.016 0.016 0.06 
t-test (diff sign) None None None None 
 
None None None None 
 
None Two None None 
Variance ratio  None None None None 
 
None None None None 
 
One One None None 
Mean bias (%) 2.7 3.8 1.3 1.2 
 
4.1 4.8 0.9 3.8 
 
1.5 2.7 0.7 1.0 




0.77 3.8, 1.27 
15.2, 
0.84   7.2, 1.06 
12.0, 
1.12 3.2, 1.02 4.0, 1.09 
 
Notes: (1) The variance ratio (for continuous covariates) of treated over non-treated should equal 1 if there is perfect balance. None indicates there is perfect balance for all covariates, and one and two 
denote the number of covariates without  perfect balance. (2) Mean bias is a summary indicator of the distribution of the absolute bias for all covariates, which ideally should be less than 5%. (3) 
Rubin's  B and R statistics are absolute standarised differences on the mean and ratio of the propensity score in the treated and non-treated groups (see Rubin [2001] for details). 





Appendix B: Estimates accounting for unobservables  
 
Another challenge for the identification of the private school effect is the non-random 
selection into private schools. Student’s background characteristics that influence schooling 
decisions are likely to influence learning outcomes independently of school choice, since they 
would be related to other parental inputs (Altonji et al., 2005; West and Woessmann 2010). 
There is also the mechanism of student sorting into high-performing schools which will 
induce students to perform better because they will be in better schools (Patrinos, 2013). Any 
observed final educational gap can be due inherent differences in characteristics of students 
and their families. Some of these differences can be controlled for as they are observed (e.g., 
parental education) but others are unobserved (such as student’s ability, motivation or 
parents’ value of education and involvement).   
Here, in Appendix B, to allow for the possibility of students and household unobservables 
driving school choice we employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Studies tend to use 
as an instrument (i.e., a phenomenon that is related to school choice but which does not have 
an impact on outcomes) family religion affiliation and to a lesser extent location or 
prevalence of specific schools (e.g., Evans and Schwab, 1995; Le and Miller, 2003). We 
employ two instruments: religion and religion interacted with residence restrictions on 
admission. The former instrument is already tested for the context of the private-public 
learning gap in Netherlands based on PISA (Patrinos, 2013), while the latter is a new 
empirical contribution which captures the fact that religious parents may choose to live in 
places near a religious school to increase the chances that their children would secure a place 
in them. Since it is quite possible for unobservables to have a different effect for low or high 
achievers, we use an IV approach but within a quantile treatment effects (QTEs) framework. 
Based on a linear model, estimates for instruments’ validity and tests seem to support our 
modelling approach overall –in particular, for the religion instrument z1 (see Table B1). First-
42 
stage results indicate a statistically significant association of z1 with private school 
attendance (i.e., parents who endorse the school’s religious policy are more likely to send 
their children to private school), but not with outcomes (i.e., parental endorsement of the 
religious policy does not have a direct impact on scores) and test results show that 
instruments are not weak, though we find evidence of endogeneity only for Australia.  
[Table B1 here] 
 
 
Results for IV QTEs for the private school effect are displayed in Table B2. The focus 
here is on IV QTEs estimates of Panel B (using the religion instrument z1). We also include 
the exogenous unconditional quantile estimates in Panel A for comparison. A few findings 
emerge from this table. First, the similarity of the full and sub-sample point estimates points 
towards the fact that unobservables are still at play after restricting the analysis to the 
subsample of public and private students with similar observed covariates. Second −and more 
importantly− selection bias operates differently between countries. Results for Australia 
suggest that the association learning-private school is driven by intrinsic students’ and 
family’s characteristics not included in our model (i.e., estimates are not significant for all 
quantiles for maths and above Q75 for reading), whereas for Portugal and Spain endogeneity 
only has in impact for the larger ability (in top quartile) group.  
[Table B2 here] 
 
Variation among countries’ results is clearly shown in Figure B1 which, in turn, is 
supported by the fact we only found evidence of endogeneity for Australia possibly explained 
by low ability students self-selecting into the private school system and thereby increasing 
their achievement. In the other two countries, however, student’s sorting into high performing 
schools seems a more plausible explanation since endogeneity only impacts at the top end of 
the achievement distribution.  
[Figure B1 here]  
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     First stage - effect of z on private school dummy 0.66*** 0.63*** 
 
0.66*** 0.63*** 
Endogeneity test 8.81 0.01 
 
9.94 0.29 
p-value 0.00 0.93 
 
0.00 0.59 
Weak identification 104.22 90.43 
 
104.22 90.43 
p-value 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
SWr2 0.44 0.35 
 
0.44 0.35 
Effect of z on y -4.03 12.36 
 
5.13 23.07*** 
      Portugal 
     First stage - effect of z on private school dummy 0.13** 0.28 
 
0.13** 0.28 
Endogeneity test 0.47 2.35 
 
0.96 2.43 
p-value 0.49 0.13 
 
0.33 0.12 
Weak identification 5.16 1.89 
 
5.16 1.89 
p-value 0.03 0.17 
 
0.03 0.17 
SWr2 0.05 0.03 
 
0.05 0.03 
Effect of z on y 8.80 -15.78 
 
12.31 -14.24 
      Spain 
     First stage - effect of z on private school dummy 0.64*** 0.62*** 
 
0.64*** 0.62*** 
Endogeneity test 0.05 0.24 
 
0.29 1.29 
p-value 0.82 0.62 
 
0.59 0.26 
Weak identification 179.71 82.35 
 
179.71 82.35 
p-value 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
SWr2 0.28 0.07 
 
0.28 0.07 
Effect of z on y 9.93** 3.35   7.34 -4.38 
 
Notes: (1) Linear IV specification based on same controls as in Table 3. (2)  The instrument variable z1 measures parents’ 
endorsement of instruction, or religious philosophy when students are admitted at schools, and the instrument variable z2 is 
constructed as the interaction of z1 with a dummy for no residence conditions on school admission. (3) Endogeneity test is 
based on Sargan-Hansen statistics, the weak identification test is based on Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, and the SWr2 
denotes the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistics.  





Table B2. IV quantile treatment effects estimates for private school in full and matched sub-samples 




Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) 
 
Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Panel A - Unconditional QTE 
     Australia: 
       Maths  30.92*** 32.95*** 16.98** 
 
25.55*** 25.94*** 16.20** 
Reading 45.39*** 43.30*** 28.41*** 
 
27.18** 36.39*** 25.50*** 
N 1,954 1,954 1,954 
 
1,392 1,392 1,392 
Portugal: 
       Maths  62.55*** 45.10*** 25.08*** 
 
53.44*** 30.07*** 21.42** 
Reading 59.72*** 33.92*** 30.74*** 
 
57.04*** 37.83*** 27.91*** 
N 3,558 3,558 3,558 
 
566 566 566 
Spain: 
       Maths  14.80*** 14.64*** 12.23*** 
 
16.20*** 15.89*** 13.71*** 
Reading 19.73*** 13.28*** 7.23** 
 
18.68*** 12.87*** 7.63** 
N 7,613 7,613 7,613 
 
4,998 4,998 4,998 
        Panel B - IV unconditional QTE (based on z1) 
    Australia: 
       Maths  12.07 17.14 -21.65 
 
8.18 13.09 -19.24 
Reading 28.21** 30.43*** -3.69 
 
38.32*** n/a 0.37 
N 1,936 1,936 1,936 
 
1,379 1,379 1,379 
Portugal: 
       Maths  87.86** 55.08** 48.22 
 
61.30** 19.86 -19.63 
Reading 83.22** 70.85*** 82.05*** 
 
54.88*** 30.9 16.36 
N 3,432 3,432 3,432 
 
561 561 561 
Spain: 
       Maths  18.85** 14.80** 7.87 
 
21.81*** 20.41*** 11.53** 
Reading 18.04** 6.91 1.71 
 
18.91*** 7.55 -3.33 
N 7,557 7,557 7,557 
 
4,965 4,965 4,965 
        Panel C - IV unconditional QTE (based on z2) 
    Australia: 
       Maths  31.24*** 37.78*** 19.63* 
 
30.22** 40.74*** 19.32* 
Reading 38.32*** 43.66*** 30.34*** 
 
53.30*** 47.475*** 24.62** 
N 1,936 1,936 1,936 
 
1,379 1,379 1,379 
Portugal: 
       Maths  56.24 27.11 -23.13 
 
12.07 -6.78 -50.86** 
Reading 31.77 -2.97 -30.81 
 
-16.68 -39.69 -100.32*** 
N 3,432 3,432 3,432 
 
561 561 561 
Spain: 
       Maths  0.39 2.34 21.58 
 
25.7 29.13 34.90** 
Reading -9.3 -1.97 -7.99 
 
-1.44 -3.09 1.09 
N 7,557 7,557 7,557   4,965 4,965 4,965 
Notes: (1) See notes of Table 3. (2) Panel A estimates are unconditional exogenous QTE based on Firpo et al. (2007), and 
estimates of Panels B and C are unconditional QTE under endogeneity based on Frölich and Melly (2013). (3) The 
instrument variable z1 measures parents’ endorsement of instruction, or religious philosophy when students are admitted at 
schools, and the instrument variable z2 is constructed as the interaction of z1 with a dummy for no residence conditions on 
school admission.  (4) The analysis is run using the Stata command ivqte (Frölich and Melly, 2010).  




Figure B1. Comparison of exogenous and endogenous QTEs of private school effects for full and matched 
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1 For some recent research using TALIS, see for instance: Duyar et al. (2013) on teacher work attitudes; Gumus 
et al. (2013) on professional development; Vieluf et al (2013) on teacher self-efficacy; Sealy et al. (2016) on 
head masters school satisfaction.  
 
2 Another, albeit technical difference, is that by employing recent results on counterfactual decomposition 
(Chernozhukov et al., 2013) and their empirical application (Chen et al., 2016) we are able to derive confidence 
intervals estimates for each contributing factor to the learning gap (by using weighted bootstrapped).  
 
3 Note that how accountability is defined within PISA has been criticized as a technical concept with a 
comparative purpose of performance, thereby ignoring political accountability leading to lower trust within 
education systems (see, for instance: Ozga, 2013; Sahlberg, 2010). 
 
4 The TALIS-PISA 2013 link sample represents a 17%, 72%, and 35% of the PISA 2012 for Australia, Portugal, 
and Spain, respectively. 
 
5 Using matching techniques to obtain matched sub-samples to isolate observables has been used to study the 
private school effect (Chudgar and Quin, 2012) and also for the learning gap related to school violence 
(Delprato et al., 2017).  A formal version of this approach is Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) where the 
balance between the treated and control groups is chosen ex-ante by the research (see Iacus et al., 2011).   
 
6 These techniques are employed in empirical economics to study the wage gap (see, Fortin et al. 2011, and 
references therein). 
 
7 Unconfoundedness (or the conditional independence assumption [CIA]) states that assignment to treatment is 
independent of the outcomes, conditional on the covariates: (Y(1) − Y(0)) ⊥ (S = 1)|X. Unconfoundedness is 
untestable, although the TALIS-PISA link contains rich information on relevant covariates that describe the 
child, their home, and learning environments to model private school choice. The second assumption, overlap 
(or common support) condition, states that probability of assignment into the treatment is bounded away from 
zero and one: 0 < Pr(S = 1|X) < 1. This condition ensures that any combination of characteristics observed in 
the treatment group can also be observed among the control group. Appendix A contains a visual inspection of 
the validity of the overlapping assumption for our application. 
 
8 Nearest neighbour consists of an algorithm that matches each treated student with the non-treated student 
displaying the closest propensity score. The method is applied without replacement. The closeness of the 
propensity scores to find matches is defined by the value of the caliper which, following previous studies (e.g., 
Gou and Fraser, 2010), we set as 0.25 × 𝜎𝑃𝑆 (25% of the standard deviation of the estimated propensity score). 
We also employ radius and kernel matching for robustness (see Appendix A). The analysis is run using the 
psmatch2 Stata routine (Leuven and Sianesi, 2012). 
 
9 It should be noted that this empirical choice is because how the return of a characteristic varies by its 
differential relationship among public and private school students (i.e., the coefficient) would require further 
insights as it is not well understood in the literature in comparison to linking the effect to the characteristic’s 
contextual or aggregate level.  
 
10 Specifically, Appendix A contains information on the quality of matching supporting our sub-sample matched 
analysis. Figures A1–A3 display the distribution of the propensity score and selected covariates in the full and 
matched samples by school type. These figures show that the gap in the probabilities of attending public and 
private schools is considerably narrowed in matched samples, whilst the distributions of household wealth and 
mother’s education are similar by school type in the matched samples too. Table A1 further supports these 
results through mean tests on all students’ covariates; we find no statistically significant difference in students’ 
characteristics in public and private schools post-matching (i.e., all t critical values are below 1.96). Also, 
different matching procedures (nearest neighbor, radius and kernel) lead to similar estimates of the private 
effect, and the overall mean biases for all covariates are below 5% (see Table A2). 
 
